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Is it appropriate to talk about revolutions for the twenty-first century?
Are ‘classic’ revolutions a thing of the past? The recent events that
attracted this label, like the Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia and
the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine, were neither radical in
their means, nor in their outcomes. They can hardly be compared to
the events that formed our understanding of revolution as a political
concept, which implied a radical break with the past achieved usually
through a violent overthrow of the ancien régime, as it happened
during the French Revolution of 1789, or the Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917. In their appearance, these new revolutions resembled a rock-
concert, or a carnival; in their outcomes they seemed rather like
elections that led merely to the replacement of one set of elites by
another – not a radical restructuring of social, political and economic
conditions. By any standard then, these were strange, even
‘conservative’ revolutions that sought not the total destruction of the
‘old order’, but rather aimed at the restoration of normality, which in
many places – such as Ukraine and Georgia – might have never
existed before. In both their aims and methods, the recent wave of
revolutions resembled the self-limiting revolutions of 1989 in Central
Europe,1 but none of the better-known ‘classical’ models. However,
even though these revolutions led neither to bloodletting nor the
emergence of a radically new set of ideas, they opened the possibility
for new beginnings.
To understand the paradoxical nature of non-violent revolution
it is useful to turn to the ‘anti-political’ thinking of dissident
intellectuals like Václav Havel, rather than the classic theorists and
practitioners of revolutions. Havel’s ideas about non-violent
                                         
1 The idea of ‘conservative’ revolutions is discussed in Stefan Auer, ‘The
paradoxes of the revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe’, Critical Horizons 4/1-2
(2004), 134.
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resistance to post-totalitarian regimes2 that was characteristic of
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s seem more relevant to our
understanding of the recent series of revolutions in Serbia, Georgia
and Ukraine than the revolutionary theories of Marx and Lenin.
Similarly, Hannah Arendt’s critique of Marx’s glorification of
violence and her writings about the ‘lost treasure of the revolutions’3
are indispensable for the consideration of political challenges arising
in our (post-)revolutionary times. This is not accidental. If the
twentieth century was, as Lenin predicted, a century of wars and
(violent) revolutions, at the beginning of the twenty first century one
might hope that this will be a century of self-limiting revolutions.
It is telling that the ‘short twentieth century’4 ended in 1989
with revolutions which were in many ways anti-Leninist. Dissident
intellectuals at the heart of the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe
were anxious not to repeat the mistakes of the regime they fought
against and imposed limits on both their methods and goals. They
rejected the Leninist notion of the necessity of violence and sought to
maintain order and a sense of legality in the midst of revolutionary
turmoil. Unlike their more radical predecessors, these revolutions
were non-teleological. They were not directed towards yet another
utopian end-goal, but rather sought to create the possibility of a new
beginning without a radical break with the past. This rather new
paradigm of revolutionary change has been emulated with greater or
lesser success in places as different as Georgia, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan.
Lenin’s reasoning about the necessity of revolutionary violence
might have been plausible in his own times, and Lenin, the
revolutionary leader, had the opportunity to prove Lenin, the theorist
of revolution, right. Ever since the French Revolution, every
revolutionary worth their salt accepted the Marxist premise that
oppressive rulers would never voluntarily give up their privileged
positions but must be forced to do so by violent means. ‘To Marx’,
Arendt argued, ‘violence, or rather the possession of the means of
violence is the constituent element of all forms of government; the
                                              
2 Václav Havel, ‘The power of the powerless’, in John Keane (ed.), The Power of
the Powerless (Armonk, 1985), pp. 125-214.
3 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York, 1961), p. 5.
4 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century (London,
1994).
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state is the instrument of the ruling class by means of which it
oppresses and exploits, and the whole sphere of political action is
characterised by the use of violence.’5 Lenin, if anything, was even
more willing to see politics as a violent struggle.6 In line with this, he
urged his followers to be ruthless with their enemies and lived up to
his words by personally signing thousands of death warrants. Those
opposing this revolutionary orthodoxy were accused of being either
naive, foolish or closet counter-revolutionaries. Their mistake was, as
Robespierre noted, that they wanted ‘a revolution without a
revolution.’ In contrast, the lesson of 1989 is that a revolution can
only be successful to the extent to which it is non-violent. Since any
genuine political power depends on consent, it must be attained and
sustained by non-violent means. In their rejection of violence as a
legitimate tool of revolutionary politics, the new revolutionaries in
Central and Eastern Europe undermined Jacobin and Leninist
traditions, vindicating alternative visions of politics articulated by the
likes of Havel and Arendt.
This article seeks to employ the conceptual apparatus developed
by Arendt and Havel in order to study the recent series of electoral
revolutions as re-enactments of the Velvet Revolutions of 1989.
While a number of scholars have investigated the connections
between the events in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, little attention has
been paid to the possible comparisons between these revolutions and
their predecessors in Central Europe. As a Russian political scientist
Sergei Markov recently argued, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,
together with its Georgian and Serbian predecessors, ‘opened a new
chapter in the theory and practice of revolutions.’ According to
Markov these revolutions are no longer ‘military uprisings like in the
nineteenth century,’ or revolutions by ‘professional political parties,
like in the twentieth century.’ These are the new kind of revolutions,
the so-called ‘revolutions by non-governmental organisations (revol-
iutsii nepravitel’stvennykh organizatsii) – which are the revolutions of
                                                
5 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 22.
6 As Andrzej Walicki demonstrated, Lenin consistently argued that a revolution
necessitated violence. ‘Not a single problem of the class struggle has ever been
solved in history except by violence,’ argued Lenin. Andrzej Walicki, Marxism
and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom (Stanford, 1995), p. 307.
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the age of globalisation and information society.’7 A renewed atten-
tion to Arendt’s insights into the relationship between violence and
political power, and how this can play out in a revolution, will reveal
that the series of electoral revolutions in the post-communist world
are not as radically new as such analysis would suggest. Similarly,
Havel’s insights into the nature of the post-totalitarian system in
Czechoslovakia in the late 1970s are applicable to the semi-authorit-
arian regimes that emerged after the collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe.
Arendt on power and violence
Arendt challenged the widespread tendency to confuse political power
with violence, by averring that ‘power and violence are opposites;
where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent.’8 This insight has
profound consequences for political actions. The destruction of
liberty in France under Robespierre, according to Arendt, was not just
a historic accident, but resulted partly from his misconceived
assumptions about the relationship between power and violence. Once
‘freedom and power have parted company’, what followed was ‘the
fateful equating of power with violence, of the political with
government, and of government with a necessary evil.’9 This
conceptual confusion helps to explain why most revolutions in the
past tended to result in the establishment of a regime more oppressive
than the one they were directed against. In Arendt’s understanding,
political power is always people power:
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to
act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it
belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the
group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in
power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain
number of people to act in their name.10   
                                                
7 Sergei Markov, ‘ “Oranzhevaia Revoliutsiia” – primer revoliutsii global’nogo
soobshestva’, in Mikhail B. Pogrebinskii (ed.), “Oranzhevaia Revoliutsiia”
(Moscow, 2005), pp. 70-71.
8 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (San Diego, 1969), p. 56.
9 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1965), p. 134.
10 Arendt, On Violence, p. 44. It is worth noting that Arendt’s usage of the term
‘power’ is somewhat idiosyncratic. To translate it into a more contemporary
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Those political rulers who resort to violence, far from demonstrating
their political power, unwittingly admit their weakness. This is not to
say that violence cannot be used in a system of domination. In fact,
countless historical examples have shown that it is possible to
substitute violence for power. As Arendt put it, ‘violence can always
destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective
command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What
never can grow out of it is power.’11 This is because political power
is not manifested in the blind and unconditional obedience of people,
but rather it depends on the capacity of individuals to gain genuine
support of others. Co-operation and support of others cannot be
imposed by force. Thus, ‘to speak of non-violent power is actually
redundant.’12 Arendt’s account of power echoes the insights of David
Hume, Montesquieu and the American federalists who shared the
belief that to some extent at least ‘all governments rest on opinion’
(James Madison). Since no rule can ever be sustained by brute force
only, tyrannical regimes are inherently weak. ‘Even the tyrant, the
One who rules against all, needs helpers in the business of violence,’
observed Arendt.13
The enigma of the post-totalitarian regime: the ‘power of the
powerless’
However, neither the countries of Central Europe in the 1970s and
1980s, nor Ukraine in the 1990s could be described as tyrannical in
the traditional sense – far from it. The political regimes in Central
Europe developed new and more refined ways of domination and
control that increasingly depended less and less on violence. As Havel
observed in post-Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, the regime was no
longer sustained primarily by the ‘armed might of its soldiers and
                                                                                                                             
idiom of political science one could talk about ‘social power’ or ‘structural
power’. See e.g. Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston, 1980),
pp. 147-48. For a very useful overview of contemporary conceptions of power,
particularly in the field of international relations, see Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in international politics’, International Organization
59/1 (2005), 39-75.   
11 Arendt, On Violence, p. 53.
12 Ibid., p. 56.
13 Ibid., p. 41.
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police’,14 but by the passive support of a population that appeared to
have accepted the lies of the dominant ideology. In fact, to the extent
that people internalised their roles in the system, society could no
longer be clearly divided between those who ruled and those who
were oppressed. The line of division went through every single
individual who, by accepting their assigned role in society, abdicated
their personal responsibility and suppressed their desire for authentic
action. In this way people were made to be complicit in the very
system that they detested. As Havel put it, there is no need for people
to accept fully the lie of the regime: ‘It is enough for them to have
accepted their life with it and in it. For by this very fact, individuals
confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, are the
system.’15 Hence, according to Havel, life in a post-totalitarian
system is ‘thoroughly permeated with hypocrisy and lies’:
Because the regime is captive to its own lies, it must falsify
everything. It falsifies the past. It falsifies the present, and it
falsifies the future. It falsifies statistics. It pretends not to
possess an omnipotent and unprincipled police apparatus. It
pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to persecute no
one. It pretends to fear nothing. It pretends to pretend
nothing.16
Havel alerted the people in Czechoslovakia to the fact that their
political system had been maintained thanks to them accepting it.
They could only do it, however, by ‘living a lie’. With some
simplification one could say that the regime was sustained by the
prevalent attitude of people characterised by a mixture of apathy,
cynicism and opportunism. But the fact that the system relied on the
tacit support of a vast majority of the population also meant,
ironically, that it was very vulnerable. This is the reason why the
‘powerless’ masses were in fact potentially very powerful. The
‘power of the powerless’ would be realised once more and more
people rejected a life of lies and attempted to ‘live in truth’.
                                                
14 Havel, ‘The power of the powerless’, p. 128.
15 Ibid., p. 136.
16 Ibid., pp. 135-36.
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Havel’s ideas about the need to defend authentic politics against
encroachment by the communist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe resonated with the thinking of other dissident intellectuals in
the region. While the terms they used were at times different, their
underlying strategies were remarkably similar. Whether we recall
Adam Michnik in Poland and his call for ‘a new evolutionism’,
György Konrád in Hungary and his ideal of an ‘anti-politics’, or
Havel and the ‘power of the powerless’, the aim that all these
intellectuals had in common was to reclaim free space in their
societies for the kind of civic activities that make freedom possible
and worthwhile.17 They refrained from fighting actively against the
government of the day and the political system it represented, and
focused instead on the creation of a ‘parallel polis’,18 a civil society
independent of the state.
This was clearly an Arendtian understanding of politics,
however confusing the different terms that describe it might look.
Arendt would have recognised in the principles of ‘anti-politics’ the
constitutive features of any politics worth their name. Similarly, the
only genuine power according to Arendt was Havel’s ‘power of the
powerless’ and the only genuine polis Benda’s ‘parallel polis’. At any
rate, the Central European dissident intellectuals seem to have learned
the Arendtian lesson about the relation between power and violence
(whether from their own experience, or the writings of Arendt and
her predecessors). This is not surprising given that Arendt’s political
thinking developed in similar circumstances, as in her dealing with
the challenge of totalitarianism. What is surprising was the fact that
even those corrupt communist leaders who in the past showed little
reluctance to resort to violence seem to have accepted the very same
Arendtian lesson; they learned that their power could no longer be
sustained by violence.   
                                                
17 This is not to deny the vast diversity of views that can be found amongst
dissident intellectuals in Central Europe. For a more systematic overview of
dissident thought on ‘anti-politics’ and civil society see Alan Renwick, ‘Anti-
political or just anti-Communist? Varieties of dissidence in East-Central Europe
and their implications for the development of political society’, East European
Politics and Societies 20/2 (2006), 286-318.
18 Václav Benda, ‘Paralelní polis’, in Vilém Prec!an (ed.), Charta 77, Od morální k
demokratické revoluci (Bratislava, 1990), pp. 43-50.
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This is not to say that the actual collapse of communism in
1989 in Central Europe simply vindicated Havel and his insights into
the mechanisms of post-totalitarian power. To say that ‘truth
prevailed’ in 1989, as Havel argued in Summer Meditations, might be
too idealistic an account of the revolutions in Central Europe.19
Clearly, there were other factors involved, including the changed
international context that removed the threat of another Soviet
invasion. It could even be asserted that opportunism prevailed in
1989.20 Once it became obvious that the regime was losing its power,
it was no longer opportune to support it. Even communist leaders
realised this; some of them realised it earlier than anyone else. This
led to elite defection on a large scale, which in turn rapidly weakened
the regime leading to its swift demise. The rapid speed of elite
defection partly accounts for the speed of the non-violent revolutions
in Central Europe which all too often surprised equally both the
participants and outside observers. As Timur Kuran astutely observed:  
Before long, fear changed sides: where people had been afraid
to oppose the regime, they came to fear being caught defending
it. Party members rushed to burn their cards, claiming they
were always reformists at heart. Top officials began sensing
that they might face retribution for resistance. They hastened to
accept the opposition’s demands, only to be confronted with
bolder ones.21
In Arendtian terms, one can say that once people realise that a regime
has very little popular support, power instantly shifts from governing
elites to the people, as members of elites try to save themselves by
quickly changing their allegiances. While a vast majority of people
feigned allegiance to the old regime, the changing revolutionary
                                                
19 Václav Havel, Letní pr!emítaní (Prague, 1991).
20 For a perceptive critique of Havel’s somewhat idealistic account of the collapse
of communism see, for example, Ernst Gellner, ‘The price of velvet: Tomas
Masaryk and Vaclav Havel’, in Gellner (ed.), Encounters with Nationalism
(Oxford, 1994), p. 128.
21 Timur Kuran, ‘The East European revolution of 1989: is it surprising that we
were surprised?’, American Economic Review 81/2 (1991), 124. For a similar
argument see also Mancur Olson, ‘The logic of collective action in Soviet-type
societies’, Journal of Soviet Nationalities 1/2 (1990), 8-27.
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situation can quickly work to undermine this apparent consensus – a
significant part of the population ends up transferring their consent to
the emerging regime.22 As a result, there were very few people left
who could serve as ‘helpers in the business of violence.’23 Regardless
of whether Havel’s ideal of ‘living in truth’ or sheer opportunism
prevailed in 1989, it is plausible to see these events as a late
vindication of Arendt’s understanding of power.24 Her hope that
political power would ultimately prevail over violence was validated
(e.g. in Poland and Czechoslovakia), as was her fear that rulers
reluctant to admit weakness would find the temptation to resort to
violence irresistible (e.g. as occurred in China).
Global norms, local actors: the Velvet Revolution as an
international norm
All the same, it is useful to reiterate that the actual collapse of
communism took most analysts and actors by surprise.25 Surprising
was its timing, non-violent character and – as mentioned above – its
                                               
22 In Kuran’s words: ‘the East European Revolution has been billed as the triumph
of truth over lying. This designation conveys the end of feigned support for
communism, but it conceals the continuation of preference falsification. Lying has
not ceased but changed character. Now it provides cover to East Europeans afraid
to admit their yearnings for the old order.’ Kuran, ‘Is it surprising that we were
surprised?’ This can also account for setbacks, or rapid reversals of support after
a relatively successful revolution. Consider the most recent paradoxical
development in Ukraine: in March 2006, Viktor Yanukovich, the unambiguous
loser of the Orange Revolution, became notionally the winner of the first genuinely
free and fair elections.
23 Arendt, On Violence.
24 As Margaret Canovan noted, ‘The revolutions of 1989 were notably Arendtian,
illustrating her account of how power can spring up as if from nowhere when
people begin to ‘act in concern,’ and can ebb away unexpectedly from apparently
powerful regimes.’ Margaret Canovan, ‘Introduction’, in Hannah Arendt, The
Human Condition (Chicago, 1998), pp. xvii-xviii. See also Winfried Thaa, Die
Wiedergeburt des Politischen (Opladen, 1996).
25 Arendt was quite unique in identifying the inherent weakness of the Soviet
empire already in 1969. Her comments on the Soviet led military suppression of
Prague Spring seem remarkably prescient today: ‘Rule by sheer violence comes
into play where power is being lost; it is precisely the shrinking power of the
Russian government, internally and externally, that became manifest in its
‘solution’ of the Czechoslovak problem.’ Arendt, On Violence, p. 53.
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speed. The memorable quip by Timothy Garton Ash that the
revolution took ten years in Poland, ten months in Hungary and
would only take ten days in Czechoslovakia became a self-fulfilling
prophecy.26 But this outcome was not pre-ordained. The rulers still
had the option to resort to violence. In Central Europe, they chose not
to. In Poland, the communist rulers might have realised that this
option was no longer feasible. Clearly, once the Soviet Union
renounced its infamous Brezhnev doctrine, there seemed to be no
force left that could be used against the Polish people – at that stage
at least it was inconceivable that Poles would fight against Poles in
order to preserve communism. In Czechoslovakia, the rulers seemed
to have learned the Polish lesson of 1989 that showed that it was
better for them to save themselves in peaceful negotiations rather than
to attempt to save a doomed regime. As all the actors in the 1989
revolution in Czechoslovakia had the possibility to learn from the
Polish and Hungarian experiences, they were able to proceed with
radical political changes significantly faster. Adam Przeworski
observed this domino effect shortly after the events. What occurred in
Czechoslovakia:
resulted from the breakdown in East Germany, what stimulated
masses of people to fill the streets in East Germany followed
the political changes in Hungary, what showed Hungarians a
way out was the success of the negotiations in Poland … The
entire event was one single snowball [and] once hundreds of
thousands of people had flooded the streets of Leipzig,
Dresden, and Berlin, once the wall had fallen, the pressure on
Czechoslovakia was irresistible.27
A similar dynamic developed more recently in Georgia (2003) and
Ukraine (2004) in societies that were very different from Central
Europe in the 1980s. Once all the basic ingredients of a ‘Velvet
Revolution’ were in place, i.e. perceived weakness of the regime,
mass demonstrations and credible opposition leaders, a revolution
could occur within a matter of weeks.
                                                
26 Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern (New York, 1990).
27 Adam Przeworski, ‘The “East” becomes the “South”? The “Autumn of the
People” and the future of Eastern Europe’, PS 24/1 (1991), 21.
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It has been noted that the opposition movements in Ukraine
received generous financial and organisational support from abroad,
which led some observers to question the authenticity of the Orange
Revolution.28 Yet, even more important than this practical Western
assistance (that could, at any rate, be seen as a legitimate attempt to
counterbalance the interference of Russia), was the less tangible,
though certainly not less important, development of international
norms. As a number of studies have demonstrated, the behaviour of
domestic actors across the globe is increasingly influenced and
constrained by international norms such as human rights.29 This
makes semi-authoritarian regimes with democratic pretences vulner-
able to the outside pressure that can strengthen the position of domes-
tic opponents. This happened in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003,
Ukraine in 2004, but also previously in the post-totalitarian regimes
of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. The rhetorical
commitments that these communist regimes made to democracy and
human rights, exemplified in their ratification of the Helsinki Final
Act agreement of 1975, inspired and strengthened the dissident
movements such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in
Poland.30 It also lent legitimacy to the direct and indirect support that
the Western powers gave to these movements.31 What is new about
the more recent series of ‘electoral revolutions’, is the fact that they
                                               
28 For a Russian skeptical perspective on the authenticity of ‘coloured’
revolutions see, for example, T.L. Poliannikov and G.V. Pokopov, ‘Sindrom
tsvetnukh revoliutsii’, Svobodnaia mysl’ 21/6 (2005). For a similar argument from
a Western perspective see Jonathan Steele, who commented that ‘intervening in
foreign elections, under the guise of an impartial interest in helping civil society,
has become the run-up to the postmodern coup d’etat, the CIA-sponsored third
world uprising of cold war days adapted to post-Soviet conditions.’ Jonathan
Steele, ‘Ukraine’s postmodern coup d’etat’, The Guardian, 26 Nov 2004. See also
Mark Almond, ‘The price of people power,’ The Guardian, 7 Dec 2004.  
29 See, for example, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds),
The Power of Human Rights (Cambridge, 1999).
30 See, for example, Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect (Princeton, 2001).
31 Not much attention has been paid in scholarly literature to the impact that
Western support had on opposition movements in Central and Eastern Europe. It
is worth noting, for example, that the CIA under Reagan administration spent
approximately $8 million per year to provide Solidarity with ‘advanced communic-
ation equipment and material assistance.’ Peter Schweizer, ‘Who broke the Evil
Empire?’, National Review 46/10 (1994), 47.
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could rely not only on this kind of Western support, but also on the
ideals of the Velvet Revolution. It is telling that the best-known
dissident movement in Belarus calls itself Charter 97.32
Employing the language of constructivist theories of internat-
ional relations, one could argue that the repeated re-enactment of the
Velvet Revolution is engendering a new set of international norms
that will help to constrain actors who find themselves in the midst of
revolutionary upheavals triggered by the decline of a semi-
authoritarian regime. In other words, the ‘script’ of the Velvet
Revolution offers a new model for radical political change. The basic
assumption of constructivist theories of international relations is that
‘international structure is determined by the international distribution
of ideas.’ In line with this, ‘shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs
about appropriate behaviour are what give the world structure, order,
and stability.’33 Once more and more people accept these ideas as
self-evident, one can talk about ‘norm internalisation’ in any given
society, in which ‘norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are
no longer a matter of broad public debate.’34 Every successful re-
enactment of the Velvet Revolution has the potential to strengthen the
credibility of a new set of norms regulating behaviour of both the
revolutionary activists as well as their opponents. Once successful,
these norms will undermine the first dogma of all traditional revol-
utionists, that radical changes can only be achieved by radical, that is
violent means.
The ‘revolution before the revolution’
In fact, a careful study of past revolutions, informed by an Arendtian
understanding of power, reveals that violence was rarely essential to
their success. As Jonathan Schell has suggested in a recent historical
study, all revolutions take place first ‘in the minds of the people’ and
are thus in some ways ‘over before they begin – or, at least, before
they are seen to begin.’35 Interestingly, Schell’s comparative survey
                                                
32 The group was ‘founded in conscious tribute to the Czechoslovak Charter 77
movement.’ Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Real and fake in Belarus’, Guardian Weekly,
31 Mar - 6 Apr 2006. For more details see www.charter97.org.
33 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and
political change’, International Organization 52/4 (1998), 894.
34 Ibid., p. 895.
35 Jonathan Schell, The Unconquerable World (New York, 2003), p. 167.
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of ‘the revolutions before the revolutions’ revealed that they were
relatively peaceful in their initial stage and only descended to viol-
ence later:
In the French Revolution, as in the English and the American,
the stage of overthrow was nearly bloodless; but the stage of
foundation was bloody – establishing a pattern that was to be
repeated in more than one revolution thereafter, and never with
more fearsome consequences than in the Russian Revolution of
1917.36
Clearly, Schell’s interpretation seems to be contradicted by innumer-
able images that stress, or even celebrate the violent character of these
revolutions. From Eugene Delacroix’s Liberty Guiding the People to
Sergei Eisenstein’s October: Ten days that shook the world,
revolutions were usually depicted as exceedingly bloody affairs. But
it is telling that more people may have died in the numerous re-
enactments of the Russian Revolution of 1917 – whether during the
festivals commemorating the revolution, or the making of Eisen-
stein’s October – than in the actual event. The communist leaders
realised that since a revolution was by definition supposed to be a
violent overthrow of the old regime, they made it appear so with their
propaganda.37 (This also helped to legitimise revolutionary violence
long after 1917, especially under Stalin.) It can be seen as a sign of
moral progress that the new revolutionaries, from Adam Michnik and
Václav Havel to Mikhail Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko, have
seen it as their duty to stress the non-violent nature of their political
struggle.   
But how real was such a revolution going to be? How pervas-
ive and sustainable was its impact? How radical were the implement-
ed changes? If it is doubtful whether the events of 1989 can be
                                             
36 Ibid.
37 As Fredrick C. Corney demonstrated in his book-length study of the ‘memory
and the making of the Bolshevik Revolution’, it required a concerted effort on
behalf of the Soviet propagandists to create a captivating story of the revolution.
To pursue this goal, the Winter Palace was turned into the Russian equivalent of
the Bastille, establishing a kind of symbolic connection with the French
Revolution that was initially rejected by a number of Bolshevik leaders. Frederick
C. Corney, Telling October (Ithaca, 2004), pp. 34-35.      
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adequately described as revolutions,38 how appropriate is the term
with respect to Georgia, Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan? If a revolution is
defined as an attempt to create a radically new political order that is
accompanied by the abolition of old privileges and the redistribution
of property, then neither the 1989 revolutions in Central Europe, nor
the more recent series of ‘electoral revolutions’ seem to qualify fully
as revolutions. If, however, a revolution is understood more modestly
as a historic event that makes new beginnings possible by political
actions that seemed inconceivable under the constraints of the existing
political regime, then the description appears to be more acceptable.
Having said this, it is important to recognise differences between the
first series of Velvet Revolutions in 1989 and their more recent
reincarnations. Clearly, the political changes implemented in the
countries of Central Europe in 1989 were much more radical than
anything that is likely to happen in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.
Whereas the revolutions in Central Europe resulted in communism
being replaced with Western-style liberal democracy (with all its
imperfections), the electoral revolution in Ukraine led to the defeat of
a corrupt regime that at least in its appearance never attempted to be
radically different from a Western-style liberal democracy. As
Michael McFaul astutely observed:
those who took to the streets to defy Kuchma’s regime did not
seek the destruction of Ukraine’s existing political institutions
or the rewriting of Ukraine’s political rules of the game …
Rather, Ukrainians protested in order to guarantee that the rules
and institutions of democracy – formally outlined in the
constitution and other documents but informally undermined
by corrupt government practices – were followed.39
                                                
38 According to Alexander J. Motyl, for example, ‘Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia have not, contrary to conventional wisdom,
experienced revolution but something akin to radical reform, transition, or
transformation’; Alexander J. Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires (New York,
1999), p. 53.
39 Michael McFaul, ‘Conclusion: the Orange Revolution in a comparative per-
spective’, in Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul (ed.), Revolution in Orange
(Washington, D.C., 2006), pp. 190-91.
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This resonates with an earlier assessment of the Rosa Revolution in
Georgia:  
the most paradoxical element of it was that it did not involve a
clash with the existing political regime as described in the
Georgian constitution. To the contrary, the November events
may be described as a revolt in defense of the constitution, an
attempt to uphold (at least formally) accepted democratic
rules.40
It is worth remembering, however, that even in 1989 there were
significant differences between individual countries in Central Europe
with respect to the kind of revolutionary situation that emerged there:
the level of public mobilisation differed as widely as the speed of
change. In Poland, the ‘revolution before the revolution’ took more
than ten years and was characterised by the emergence of a mass
movement that was unprecedented in the communist bloc; Solidarity
in its heyday had up to ten million members. In Czechoslovakia, in
contrast, there was very little mass mobilisation before November
1989 and the opposition movement was largely limited to a relatively
small number of non-conformist intellectuals and artists (even the
Charter 77 had relatively few signatories). The lethargy that charac-
terised Czechoslovak society after the suppression of the Prague
Spring in 1968-69 seems to have been overcome virtually overnight –
a development that surprised external observers as much as it did the
leading actors directly involved in the Velvet Revolution. (It suffices
to recall that no less a figure than Havel was very sceptical about the
possibility of an anti-communist revolution in Czechoslovakia as late
as in the summer of 1989.) In November 1989, as if to compensate
for the lack of public engagement in post-1968 ‘normalised’
Czechoslovakia, people flooded the streets of Prague, Bratislava and
all the other major cities, surprising them-selves with these displays
of civic courage. But this sudden manifest-ation of civic virtue was in
reality a poor substitute for civil society. In this sense the revolution
in Czechoslovakia seems rather less ‘real’ than its Polish predecessor.
It appears that Czechoslovak society no longer needed to undergo all
                                               
40 Ghia Nodia, ‘Breaking the mold of powerlessness: the meaning of Georgia's
latest revolution’, in Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wertsch (eds), ‘Enough!’ The
Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia 2003 (New York, 2005), p. 99.
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the profound changes that anticipated the collapse of communism in
Poland because it was able to make use of the Polish ‘revolution
before the revolution.’  
This is not to deny the authenticity of the Czechoslovak Velvet
Revolution, but rather it is an attempt to put it into perspective. In
their struggle of 1989, Czechs and Slovaks were able to invoke the
best aspects of their respective national traditions, including the
legacy of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the Prague Spring.41
In addition, however, they were able to build on Polish experiences
and facilitate their own goals by using tools imported from abroad.42
Moreover, the Czechoslovak communist elites also learned their
lesson from Poland and accepted their defeat without giving in to the
temptation of resorting to violence. Ironically, the roundtable
discussions in Czechoslovakia that paved the way for a peaceful
transfer of power were instigated by the communist leaders rather
than the opposition movements, the latter of  which accepted this
process only reluctantly.43
A similar dynamic was in place fifteen years later in Ukraine.
Clearly, all the actors involved in the revolutionary turmoil in
Ukraine of November 2004 were aware of the historic precedence of
a non-violent revolution. In fact, they might have been reminded of
this precedence by the crucial players from the Polish revolution of
1980-89, such as Alexander Kwas "niewski and Lech Walesa, who
became directly involved in the Ukrainian events. Furthermore, the
opposition movement even produced a book that advised its
supporters on the politics of non-violent action – a translation of
Gene Sharp’s study From Dictatorship to Democracy, which is
something of a manual for ‘non-revolutionary revolutionaries’.44
                                                
41 See also Stefan Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (London, 2004).
42 This point is further discussed in Stefan Auer, ‘After 1989, who are the
Czechs?’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 12 (2006), forthcoming.
43 Jir!í Suk, Labyrintem Revoluce (Prague, 2003).
44 The American scholar Gene Sharp at the Albert Einstein Institution in Boston,
Massachusetts, has published numerous books advocating the virtues of non-
violent struggle for justice. In line with Arendt, Sharp is very critical of the use of,
and justification for revolutionary violence. See, for example, Sharp, Social Power
and Political Freedom, particularly chapter 6, ‘Freedom and revolution: a review
of Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution’, pp. 141-60. Like Arendt and Havel, Sharp is
fascinated by the experience of the Czechoslovak peaceful resistance in 1968-
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Andrew Wilson, in his detailed account of the Orange Revolution,
reports that many opposition activists feared the very real possibility
that a Romania-like scenario might emerge in Ukraine. Yet, in hind-
sight it seems plausible to suggest that not only the opposition but
also the powers that be might have feared such a scenario and opted
reluctantly for negotiations, rather than risking a full-blown violent
confrontation. Walesa surely overstated his influence by claiming that
he single-handedly prevented bloodshed in Ukraine by talking to
Yanukovich and urging him not to use brute force.45 Yet, it is safe to
assume that both Kuchma and Yanukovich knew that by renouncing
violence they would dramatically decrease the danger of becoming
victims of violent retributions after their defeat. This was also one of
the lessons of the Velvet Revolution – the opposition leaders’ princip-
led rejection of violence made it easier for the rulers to accept their
defeat, as by accepting their loss of power they were not risking their
lives. (To put it simply, they had a choice between the fate of General
Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland and that of Nicolae Ceausescu in
Romania.) It is quite telling that after the event, there has been a
veritable competition amongst the major actors as to who should take
more credit for preventing bloodshed.46  
                                                                                                                                     
1969. See Gene Sharp, Making Europe Unconquerable (London, 1985), pp. 47-
49. However, it is worth noting that Havel was not totally opposed to violence,
and even criticised ‘the blindness of European pacifism’ that he saw as ‘one of the
factors that prepared the ground for the Second World War;’ Havel, ‘The power of
the powerless.’
45 Daniel McLaughlin, ‘Walesa says he averted Ukraine clashes’, The Observer, 1
May 2005. Walesa’s warning was reinforced by Alexander Kwasniewski, who, by
virtue of being a former communist and a trusted partner of Kuchma, was likely to
have had more influence on Yanukovich. For more details see Marcin Bosacki and
Marcin Wojciechowski, ‘Kulisy rewolucji Ukrain "skiej’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 Apr
2005, Marcin Wojciechowski, ‘Druga misja Kwas"niewskiego na Ukrainie’, Gazeta
Wyborcza, 30 Nov 2004. For the initial involvement of Lech Walesa see also Piotr
Adamovicz and Pawel Reszka, ‘Polska solidarna z Ukraina #’, Rzeczpospolita, 26
Nov 2004.
46 Taras Kuzio, ‘The opposition’s road to success’, Journal of Democracy 16/2
(2005), 117-30. In a similar vein, General Jaruzelski in Poland defended his
decision to declare martial law in December 1981 with the argument that this was
necessary in order to preempt a Soviet invasion and so prevent more bloodshed.  
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Post-communist Ukraine as a paradigm of defective democracy
When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 and Ukraine declared its
independence, many people assumed that the country could join
Central Europe in its quick progress towards liberal democracy. Some
ten years later the prospects seemed distinctly less optimistic, the
mood more despondent. The common denominator of most studies of
Ukraine published before (or during!) the Orange Revolution was the
identification of a weak, or non-existent civil society and the concern
with poorly functioning democratic institutions. As Ilya Prizel
observed, ‘decades of brutal repression in Ukraine by both foreign
and domestic rulers had created a remarkably isolated, atomised, and
malleable population’47 that seemed forever captured by its corrupt
elites. There was no end in sight for ‘Ukraine’s hollow decade’, as
long as society remained atomised and the elites corrupt, selfish and
cynical. In a similar vein, Elena Korosteleva argued that Ukraine,
along with Belarus, epitomised a new kind of regime that can be
labelled a ‘quasi-democracy’, an ‘almost democracy’ or a ‘demagog-
ical democracy’. Even though this was ‘a borderline case, being
neither democracy, nor dictatorship,’48 it was characterised by a
remarkable degree of political stability:
A demagogical democracy functions to create the perfect
illusion of a democratic partnership between those in power
and their retinue who elect them on their behalf, and to make
voters believe that their opinion matters … The essence of such
democracy, however, is manipulation, and no matter how
quasi-inclusive and competitive the relationship is, it suggests a
strong bias towards the rulers – the demagogues – who use the
low level of public consciousness to negotiate their benefits
from the system legally.49
                                                
47 Ilya Prizel, ‘Ukraine’s hollow decade’, East European Politics and Societies
16/2 (2002), 363-85.
48 Elena A. Korosteleva, ‘The quality of democracy in Belarus and Ukraine’, The
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20/1 (2004), 127.
49 Ibid.
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This description echoes Havel’s insights into the working of a post-
totalitarian system in communist Czechoslovakia. Both assessments
stress the importance of appearances for the maintenance of the
respective repressive systems and offer a nuanced account of the
power relationship within respective societies. But while Havel as a
political activist attempted to show how vulnerable the system was
once people understood its underlying logic, Korosteleva as a political
analyst seeks to demonstrate how stable such a regime can be. As in
Czechoslovakia before 1989, however, neither the political activists,
nor the external observers really expected any radical changes to
occur in Ukraine. Both regimes succeeded in creating the illusion of
stability. As Paul Kubicek has noted, ‘given the stagnation in society
and powers of the existing elite, it is hard to see how Ukraine will
extricate itself from the mire of stagnation.’50 Similarly, Korosteleva
concluded her study by arguing that people in Ukraine were
‘emotionally … not yet ready for democracy, advocating strong and
single-handed leadership and being uncertain about the supremacy of
law in a crisis.’51 In contrast, most observers of Ukraine writing after
the revolution stress the ‘active and politically sophisticated’ nature of
Ukrainian society.52
                                                
50 Paul Kubicek, ‘The limits of electoral democracy in Ukraine’, Democratization
8/2 (2001), 131. Tim Beichelt concurred with these findings. The electoral regime
of Ukraine, in which ‘not democratic competition, but loyalty to the president is
the dominant game in town,’ was likely to lead to political paralysis, not change.
‘This makes it rather improbable that the defective democracy of … Ukraine will
bring in more liberal and less delegative government practices, in the short term at
last.’ Tim Beichelt, ‘Autocracy and democracy in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine’,
Democratization 11/5 (2004), 126 and 129.  
51 Korosteleva makes much of the point that 75% of Ukrainians surveyed did not
‘believe that participation in politics is “a duty” ’ (which is re-phrased rather
misleadingly as ‘75 per cent of respondents believe that “participation in politics”
has nothing to do with citizens’ rights and responsibilities’), but she largely
ignores her more encouraging findings that point towards growing awareness of
Ukrainian citizens of deficiencies of Kuchma’s regime. For example, the study
quotes people describing the situation in Ukraine as ‘criminal democracy’,
‘shambles democracy’, ‘clan democracy’ and a ‘corrupt state’. Surely the
awareness of problems is the first pre-condition of addressing them! Korosteleva,
‘The quality of democracy in Belarus and Ukraine’, pp. 132 and 134.
52 McFaul, ‘Conclusion: the Orange Revolution in a comparative perspective’, p.
167.
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Orange Revolution: people power or Western plot?  
With the privilege of hindsight, it is easy to point out that most
analysts underestimated the potential of a ‘defective democracy’ in
Ukraine to turn towards a more substantive democracy. There are two
simple strategies to deal with this challenge: it is either possible to
argue that there was significantly more civil society than most
observers previously allowed for,53 or it is possible to argue that the
revolution was simply imposed on the people of Ukraine by the
Western powers, such as the US, with their well-funded programs of
‘democracy promotion’.54 These explanatory strategies are
incomplete, if not misleading.
Clearly, both grass root activities of civil society movements
and Western pressure played an important role in the Orange
Revolution.55 However, in order to fully understand the dynamics of
political changes in Ukraine it is also important to consider the role
that the Velvet Revolution had as a precedence demonstrating the
possibility of radical changes achieved by relatively moderate means.
The Velvet Revolution was not only a source of inspiration for the
opposition movement, but informed the behavior of the incumbent
rulers who seem to have realised, if only reluctantly and at a very late
stage, that the costs of their defeat could have been better managed in
a roundtable discussion than in an open military confrontation. While
Kuchma had warned in early November 2004, that is shortly before
the second round of presidential elections, that ‘revolution will not be
tolerated,’56 by the time the opposition movement managed to
                                                
53 Nadia Diuk writes that ‘without doubt, Ukraine has had the most mature civil
society of any post-Soviet state.’ Nadia Diuk, ‘The triumph of civil society’, in
Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul (eds), Revolution in Orange (Washington,
D.C., 2006), pp. 82-83.  
54 For a more balanced and sophisticated account of these influences see Oleksandr
Sushko and Olena Prystayko, ‘Western influence’, in Anders Åslund and Michael
McFaul (eds), Revolution in Orange (Washington, D.C., 2006), pp. 125-44,
Andrew Wilson, ‘Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the role of the West’,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19/1 (2006), 21-33.
55 See for example Markov, ‘ “Oranzhevaia Revoliutsia” ’.
56 See Lucan Way, ‘Kuchma’s failed authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 16/2
(2005), 142. Way also reports (ibid.) that ‘police chief Mykola Bilokon appeared
on television to assure viewers that in Ukraine, in contrast to Georgia, the police
would defend “the constitutional order”.’
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mobilise mass demonstrations in late November, Kuchma may not
have had the option of using violence in his defence. It was clear, at
any rate, that ‘by this point, such a move would have been immensely
risky. It is likely that many in the security forces would have refused
to follow orders to suppress the demonstrations, and it is possible that
such orders would have sparked violent conflict between the different
branches of government.’57 This corroborates Arendt’s insight into
the relationship between power and violence in a revolutionary
upheaval:
In a contest of violence against violence the superiority of the
government has always been absolute; but this superiority lasts
only as long as the power structure of the government is intact
– that is, as long as commands are obeyed and the army or
police forces are prepared to use their weapons. When this is no
longer the case, the situation changes abruptly.58
If – as political theorists from David Hume to Hannah Arendt have
reminded us – even a tyrannical regime depends on support of the
people, this must be much more so in a non-democratic regime that
pretends to emulate a liberal democratic model. This is why it can be
difficult in the long run to sustain a regime that seeks to hide its
autocratic practices behind a façade of democracy. Political analysts
had rightly warned that the existence of formal democratic
institutions in Ukraine, including elections, is ‘only a necessary, not
sufficient component of democracy,’59 but they underestimated the
potential of these institutional arrangements to lead to genuine
political contestation. Whether the Ukrainian regime was called
‘electoral democracy’, ‘defective democracy’, or a ‘blackmail
state’,60 the assumption was that it would not democratise fully, at
least not in the foreseeable future. But even ‘Potemkin’ democracy,61
or fake democratic practices, can – albeit indirectly – lead to more
                                              
57 Ibid., p. 143.
58 Arendt, On Violence, p. 48.
59 Kubicek, ‘The limits of electoral democracy in Ukraine’.
60 Keith A. Darden, ‘Blackmail as a tool of state domination: Ukraine under
Kuchma’, East European Constitutional Review 10/2-3 (2001), 67-71.
61 Charles King, ‘Potemkin democracy: four myths of post-Soviet Georgia’, The
National Interest (Summer 2001), 93-104.
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genuine democratisation. As Lucan A. Way has recently argued, most
observers failed to notice the inherent weakness of a Ukrainian
‘competitive authoritarianism’, which relied on a mixture of
corruption, blackmail and manipulation of public opinion.62 If ‘the
ballot box’ had been seen until recently as ‘the coffin of
revolutionaries’,63 the new phenomenon of electoral revolutions is
turning this dictum around: fraudulent elections can actually trigger a
revolution.
The character and the outcome of such revolution is determined
not only by relevant domestic actors and their particular
circumstances, but increasingly also by the emerging paradigm of
Velvet Revolution, that provides these actors with a script easily
adaptable to their own predicament. But as in Central Europe, this
outcome was not preordained and it is plausible to think of alternative
outcomes in which violence could have prevailed. There is no reason
to assume that Kuchma and his supporters had any principled
objections against the use of brute force, but they may have learned
from their own experience that violence does not always bring the
intended results. The killing of the opposition journalist Georgi
Gongadze, for which Kuchma was allegedly responsible, may have
silenced one critical voice, but resulted at the same time in a public
outcry that severely weakened Kuchma’s power. Similarly, the
poisoning of Yushchenko failed to eliminate him as the most
promising political competitor. If anything, it might have increased
his credibility as a trustworthy political leader, and strengthened his
own determination to defeat Kuchma’s corrupt regime. Yushchenko’s
near-death experience turned him into a convincing oppositionist; his
disfigured face became a symbol of the people’s defiance of the old
regime. (It is open to speculation whether the death of Yushchenko
could have saved Kuchma’s corrupt regime. It might have galvanised
the opposition movement no less than his survival and subsequent
political actions.)
                                                
62 Way, ‘Kuchma’s failed authoritarianism’.
63 Jeff Goodwin, ‘The renewal of socialism and the decline of revolution’, in John
Foran (ed.), The Future of Revolutions (London, 2003), pp. 59-72.
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Arendt or Fukuyama ~ Ukraine or Uzbekistan
Whatever the more pessimistic alternatives to the success of the
Orange Revolution might have been, they did not eventuate. The
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, alongside with Georgia (2003), Serbia
(2000) – and their predecessors in Central Europe (1989) – were
driven according to the script of the Velvet Revolution in which good
prevails over evil, truth over hypocrisy and democratic ideals over
tyranny. Political leaders who until yesterday were seen as hopeless
dreamers are suddenly admired as great pragmatists, thanks to their
determination to fight for justice. Wherever and whenever it occurs,
the story of the Velvet Revolution has fairytale-like qualities. They
are reminiscent more of the dreams of optimistic liberals like Francis
Fukuyama who believe that the future is bright because it is liberal,
rather than the likes of Arendt who are acutely aware of the dangers
to liberty.
But there is no need to betray Arendt’s heritage here. The story
of the Velvet Revolution would be incomplete without considering its
darker side. Firstly, wherever and whenever the Velvet Revolution
occurs, it is followed by some kind of ‘Velvet’ corruption. There is,
for example, a small industry that seeks to prove Havel’s high ideals
wrong by highlighting his own personal failings as well as the
shortcomings of Czech democracy.64 Similarly, observers of the more
recent developments in Georgia have already identified the ‘thorns of
the Rose Revolution’.65 More recently still, no lesser figure than
Havel identified the ‘post-Orange blues’ in Ukraine.66 This is not
                                                
64 See, for example, John Keane, Václav Havel: A political tragedy in six acts
(London, 1999) or the more balanced study by Aviezer Tucker, The Philosophy
and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patocka to Havel (Pittsburgh, 2000).
65 Jasper von Altenbockum, ‘Die Stacheln der Rosenrevolution’, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 Apr 2005; Melik Kaylan, ‘After the roses, the thorns’, Wall
Street Journal Europe, 10 May 2005.
66 ‘All revolutions, in the end, turn from euphoria to disillusion.’ Václav Havel,
‘Another stage in self-liberation from communism’, The Australian, 27 Mar 2006,
p. 15. Havel’s observations on the eve of the elections day seemed to be
vindicated by the results. But whether the relative success of the Yanukovich’s
‘Party of the Regions’ meant that ‘darkness descend[ed] on Ukraine’s new dawn,’
as a headline in The Guardian Weekly put it, remains to be seen. Tom Parfitt,
‘Orange Revolution turns blue: darkness descends on Ukraine’s new dawn as in-
fighting hands vote to old guard’, The Guardian Weekly 31 Mar - 6 Apr 2006, p. 1.
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surprising. ‘The history of revolutions’, Arendt observed, ‘could be
told in a parable form as the tale of an age-old treasure which, under
the most varied circumstances, appears abruptly, unexpectedly, and
disappears again, under different mysterious conditions, as though it
were a fata morgana.’67 Even when the revolution seems relatively
successful and non-violent, its future is far from certain. Moreover,
the script of the Velvet Revolution often failed even in its initial
stage; clearly, truth does not always prevail. This is the second, more
sobering lesson of the Velvet Revolution. The revolutionary
experience of 1989 also includes a Chinese solution to the problem of
power, and there were many more failed attempts to challenge
authoritarian rule ever since: it suffices to mention Azerbaijan in
October 2003 and Uzbekistan in May 2005 as timely reminders of the
fact that violence can destroy power. As Arendt cautioned:
we do not know where these developments will lead us, but we
know, or should know, that every decrease in power is an open
invitation to violence – if only because those who hold power
and feel it slipping from their hands, be they the government or
be they the governed, have always found it difficult to resist
the temptation to substitute violence for it.68
The guarded optimism of this article is based on the assumption that
this fatal temptation is significantly weakened by the possibility,
created by the script of the Velvet Revolution, of accepting defeat
without resorting to violence. This is not the end of history. Whereas
the script of the Velvet Revolution needs a happy end, history has no
such ends, and the best we can hope for is to create possibilities for
new beginnings.
                                                                                                                                     
The more recent headlines are, at any rate, more optimistic: Steven Lee Myers
writes about ‘Ukraine on verge of new pro-Western coalition’, New York Times,
21 June 2006.
67 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 5.
68 Arendt, On Violence, p. 87.
